It is shown that the independence of the continuum hypothesis points to the unique definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality: the intermediate set exists only as a subset of continuum. This latent status is a consequence of duality of the members of the set. Due to the structural inhomogeneity of the intermediate set, its complete description falls into several "sections" (theories) with their special main laws, dimensions, and directions, i.e., the complete description of the one-dimensional intermediate set is multidimensional (all the members of the set cannot be arranged in the same line). Quantum mechanics is one of these theories.
The set of intermediate cardinality represents a golden mean between the two opposing concepts of continuous and discrete space. But although the continuum problem has been solved [1] , the status of the set of intermediate cardinality is still unclear. However, it may be stated that the independence of the continuum hypothesis (CH) determines a unique definite status of the intermediate set.
There are the following two key points: First, the intermediate set, by definition, must be a subset of continuum (continuum must contain a subset equivalent to the intermediate set). Second, any separation of the subset is a proof of existence of the intermediate set, which contradicts the independence of CH.
Comparing this points, we arrive at the following conclusion: existence of the subset of intermediate cardinality in continuum does not require any additional assumption and does not contradict the independence of CH on condition that this subset, in principle, cannot be separated from continuum. This is the only possible understanding of the independence of CH if ZermeloFraenkel set theory is consistent, complete, and giving the correct description of the notion of set, i.e., if the independence of CH is the ultimate solution of the continuum problem in the framework of good set theory of full value.
Note that this latent status is the only definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality that follows from the generally accepted solution of the continuum problem.
Neither CH nor its negation may be taken as an axiom because they both are not obvious. But it is worthwhile to emphasize that if we take CH as an axiom this subset will be lost. Therefore, CH is not admissible hypothesis. On the other hand, if we take not-CH as an axiom we shall get the following result: since any separation or any construction of the intermediate set are forbidden by the independence of CH, we have to reconcile with the same "hidden" subset in continuum which we can get without any additional assumption.
According to the separation axiom schema, for any set and for any property expressed by some formula there exists a subset of the set, which contains only members of the set having the property. Then some subset cannot be separated from continuum if each point of the subset does not have its own peculiar properties but only combines properties of the members of the countable set and continuum (duality). Only these properties do not contradict the independence of CH because they do not allow separation of the intermediate set from continuum. If the members of the set of intermediate cardinality had any unique property, then it would be possible to separate them and to prove existence of the intermediate set.
Note that the content of the duality coincides with the content of waveparticle duality: quantum particle combines properties of a wave (continuum) and a point-like particle (the countable set).
As an illustration, consider a brick road which consists of black bricks and white bricks. If we know (or suspect) that among them there are some bricks which have white top sides and black bottom sides (or vice versa, i.e., these bricks combine the sides "from" the white brick and "from" the black brick), we, nevertheless, cannot find them. Based only on the top view, the problem of separation (and even existence) of the black-and-white bricks of this kind is undecidable. Each brick can be black-and-white with equal probability. However, if we have the top view and the bottom view, we can find these bricks: each of them looks like a white brick in the one view and like a black brick in the other view ("black-white duality").
In the general case, we can get an undecidable statement, analogous to CH, if we have a set consisting of members of two or more kinds: except for the members of the kinds, we must take into account possibility of the dual or even polymorphic members. At present, set theory do not allow for such members because they do not seem to be elementary enough. Indeed, it is hard to believe that in a box with the black balls and the white balls there is a ball which looks either like a black ball or like a white ball subject to the examination. In order to be "two-faced" such a ball needs some actuating mechanism. However, this behavior is similar to the ordinary behavior of the elementary quantum objects: in quantum mechanics, we have space continuum of classical mechanics (a macroscopic measuring apparatus describing by classical rules) and, inside this continuum, some dual objects (microscopic particles) "looking" either like wave or like a point-like particle depending on the experiment.
In order to get information about the "invisible" set consider the maps of the intermediate set I to the sets of real numbers (R) and natural numbers (N ).
Let the map I → N decompose I into the countable set of equivalent mutu-ally disjoint infinite subsets: ∪I n = I (n ∈ N ). Let I n be called a unit set. All members of I n have the same countable coordinate n. Consider the map I → R. Continuum R contains a subset M equivalent to I, i.e., there exists a bijection
This bijection reduces to a separation of the intermediate subset M from continuum. Since any separation procedure is a proof of existence of the intermediate set and, therefore, contradicts the independence of the continuum hypothesis, we, in principle, do not have a rule for assigning a definite real number to a point of the intermediate set. Hence, any bijection can take a point of the intermediate set only to a random real number. If we do not have preferable real numbers, then we have the equiprobable mapping. This already conforms to the quantum free particle. In the general case, we have the probability P (r)dr of finding a point s ∈ I about r. Thus the point of the intermediate set has two coordinates: a definite natural number and a random real number:
Only the natural number coordinate gives reliable information about the relative positions of the points of the set and the size of its interval. But the points of a unit set are indistinguishable. It is clear that the probability P (r) depends on the natural number coordinate of the corresponding point. Note that the information about a point in the one-dimensional intermediate set is necessarily two-dimensional. For two real numbers a and b the probability P a∪b dr of finding s in the union of the neighborhoods (dr) a ∪ (dr) b
because s corresponds to both (all) points at the same time (the events are not mutually exclusive). It is convenient to introduce a function ψ(r) such that P (r) = P[ψ(r)] and ψ a∪b = ψ(a)+ψ(b). The idea is to compute the non-additive probability from some additive object by a simple rule. We have
i.e., the dependence P[ψ(r)] is non-linear. The simplest non-linear dependence is a square dependence:
The probability P (r) is not probability density because we cannot integrate it due to its non-additivity (an integral is a sum). The normalization condition means only that f is a bijection: we can find only one image of the point s in R.
But this is coincidence. Actually, the concept of probability should be modified, since the additivity law is one of the axioms of the conventional probability theory.
An illustration in terms of the above brick road will make this clear: If we know the exact number N B−W of the black-and-white bricks, we do not need to check all the bricks of perhaps infinite brick road. It is reasonable to stop checking when all this bricks are obtained and put
where P B−W is the probability of finding a black-and-white brick, N checked is the exact (minimal) number of the bricks checked. Thus only N checked may vary in the different test runs (finding all the black-and-white bricks). We can refine N checked by replicate test runs but, in fact, we get one more problem: stability or, in the general case, behavior of N checked in the different test runs (in other words, the form of time dependence N checked (t)).
In [2] Feynman wrote: "The concept of probability is not altered in quantum mechanics. When we say the probability of a certain outcome of an experiment is p, we mean the conventional thing, i.e., that if the experiment is repeated many times, one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome in question is roughly p."
It is clear what will happen "if the experiment is repeated many times" after all the black-and-white bricks have been already found.
The concept of probability for continuum should also be modified, since the point may be always found in a finite interval. We do not need to take into account remaining empty continuum.
But we shall not alter the concept of probability because it "is not altered in quantum mechanics". This means that we shall regard P (r) = |ψ(r)| 2 as a probability density, i.e., we accept Born postulate. The main purpose of the paper is to show that quantum mechanics describes the set of intermediate cardinality.
The function ψ, necessarily, depends on n: ψ(r) → ψ(n, r). Since n is accurate up to a constant (shift) and the function ψ is defined up to the factor e iconst , we have ψ(n + const, r) = e iconst ψ(n, r).
Hence, the function ψ is of the following form:
Thus the point of the intermediate set corresponds to the function Eq.(8) in continuum. We can specify the point by the function ψ(n, r) before the mapping and by the random real number and the natural number when the mapping has performed. In other words, the function ψ(n, r) may be regarded as the image of s in R between mappings.
Consider probability P (b, a) of finding the point s at b after finding it at a. Let us use a continuous parameter t for correlation between continuous and countable coordinates of the point s (simultaneity) and in order to distinguish between the different mappings (events ordering):
where t a < t < t b and ψ(t) = ψ[n(t), r(t)]. For simplicity, we shall identify the parameter with time without further discussion. Note that we cannot use the direct dependence n = n(r). Since r = r(n) is a random number, the inverse function is meaningless. Assume that s is an "observable" point, i.e., for each t ∈ (t a , t b ) there exists the image of the point in continuum R.
Partition interval (t a , t b ) into k equal parts ε:
The conditional probability of of finding the point s at r(t i ) after r(t i−1 ) is given by
(unmonitored zone between t i−1 and t i will be reduced to zero by passage to the limit ε → 0), i.e.,
where ∆n i = |n(t i ) − n(t i−1 )|. Note that ∆n i is really a vector. The probability of the sequence of the transitions r 0 , . . . , r i , . . . r k
is given by
i.e.,
Then probability of the corresponding continuous sequence of the transitions r(t):
where
Since at any time t a < t < t b the point s corresponds to all points of R, it also corresponds to all continuous random sequences of mappings r(t) simultaneously.
Probability P [r(t)] of finding the point at any time t a ≤ t ≤ t b on r(t) is non-additive too. Therefore, we introduce an additive functional φ[r(t)]. In the same way as above, we get
Taking into account Eq.(16), we can put
Thus we have
i.e., the probability P (a, b) of finding the point s at b after finding it at a satisfies the conditions of Feynman's approach (section 2-2 of [2] ) for S/h = 2πm. Therefore,
where K(a, b) is the path integral (2-25) of [2] :
Since Feynman does not essentially use in Chap. 2 that S/h is just action, the identification of 2πm and S/h may be postponed. In section 2-3 of [2] Feynman explains how the principle of least action follows from the dependence
We can apply the same nonrigourous reasoning to Eq.(20) and, for "very, very" large m, get "the principle of least m". This also means that for large m the point s has a definite stationary path and, consequently, a definite continuous coordinate. In other words, the corresponding interval of the intermediate set is sufficiently close to continuum (let the interval be called macroscopic), i.e., cardinality of the intermediate set depends on its size. Recall that we can measure the size of an interval of the set only in the unit sets (some packets of points).
Since large m may be considered as continuous variable, we have
The function n(t) may be regarded as some function of r(t): n(t) = η[r(t)]. It is important that r(t) is not random in this case (for large m). Therefore,
where dη drṙ is some function of r,ṙ, and t (note absence of higher time derivatives thanṙ). This is a formulation of the principle of least action, i.e., large m can be identified with action.
Since the value of action depends on units of measurement, we need a parameter h (depending on units only) such that
Finally, we may substitute S/h for 2πm in Eq. (22) and consider Feynman's formulation of quantum mechanics as a description of the set of intermediate cardinality.
Since cardinality of an interval of the intermediate set depends on its size, we have three basic kinds of the interval:
Macroscopic interval. This interval is large enough to be regarded as continuos. It has non-zero length.
Microscopic interval. This interval may not be regarded as continuos. It has no length, i.e., its continuos image is exactly a point.
Submicroscopic interval. It is an intermediate kind of the interval with unstable random length. Its length is either zero or non-zero random real number depending on mapping. This property is just wave-particle duality: the submicroscopic interval looks either like a point or like a continuous interval. Due to the factor e 2πim in Eq.(19), this instability shows periodic character and may be described by means of the concept of wave. Oscillatory instability makes the difference between the "classical" inexact length and quantum random length (and, in combination with non-additivity, between classical and quantum probabilities). Submicroscopic intervals make the region of quantum mechanics.
Note that we can substitute action for m only for sufficiently high time rate of change of the countable coordinate n because, if ∆n i = |n(t i ) − n(t i−1 )| in Eq. (24) is not sufficiently large to be considered as an (even infinitesimal) interval of continuum, action reduces to zero. In other words, the change in size of the intermediate set, from t a to t b , should not be microscopic (exact zero, from macroscopic point of view). Zero-action may be understood as vanishing of mass of the point. Recall that mass is a factor which appear in Lagrangian of a free point as a peculiar property of the point under consideration, i.e., formally, mass may be regarded as a consequence of the principle of least action [3] and, consequently, of the sufficiently high time rate of change of the countable coordinate (cardinality). Figuratively, mass is something like air drag which is substantial only for sufficiently fast bodies.
Consider the special case of constant time rate of change ν of the countable coordinate n. We have m = ν(t b − t a ). Then "the principle of least m" reduces to "the principle of least t b − t a ". If ν is not sufficiently large (massless point), this is the simplest form of Fermat's least time principle for light. The more general form of Fermat's principle follows from Eq.(24): since
we obviously get
where v(t) = dr/dt. In the case of non-zero action (mass point), the principle of least action and Fermat's principle "work" simultaneously. It is clear that any additional factor can only increase the "pure least" time. As a result, t b − t a for a massless point bounds below t b − t a for any other point and, therefore, (b − a)/(t b − t a ) for massless point bounds above average speed between the same points a and b for continuous image of any point of the intermediate set. This is a step towards special relativity. Galileo's relativity principle may be considered as a consequence of replacement, in the macroscopic case, of the absolute natural number by the integral (action): the integrand (Lagrangian) is defined up to the total time derivative. This lack of uniqueness results in the relativity principle (in a sense, microscopic absolute space turns to macroscopic relative space).
In consequence of size-dependence of the intermediate set, there is no need of an external continuous container-set in order to satisfy the basic conclusion that the set of intermediate cardinality must be a subset of continuum. The intermediate set is contained in its own sufficiently large interval. This containerinterval corresponds to the Copenhagen macroscopic measuring apparatus. In other words, the intermediate set is a substantially microscopic set. Separation of the intermediate subset from continuum, in some figurative sense, means "enlargement" of the subset which in turn means increasing of its cardinality and, as a consequence, loss of "microscopicity" of the set.
Since the principle of least action is an intrinsic property of the set of intermediate cardinality relating to the macroscopic intervals of the set, it may be stated that classical mechanics is a description of the macroscopic intermediate intervals.
Quantum mechanics describes the submicroscopic intervals in terms of the continuous description. This description also has its particular main law: the wave equation.
From macroscopic point of view, there are two kinds of points: the true points and the composite points. A composite point (the microscopic interval) consist of an infinite number of points. It is uniquely determined by the natural number of unit sets. Cardinality of the proper microscopic interval may be regarded as some qualitative property of the point. If the interval is destroyed (decay of the corresponding point), this property vanishes and turns to the properties (cardinalities) of the output intervals.
Thus the description of the proper microscopic intervals reduces to the description of transmutation of expanded (non-local) but, at the same time, pointlike objects and their properties, i.e., it is similar to particle physics phenomenology and some aspects of string theories (but without tension and length of a string). It is clear that the proper microscopic description appears only in combination with at least one of the other descriptions. The submicroscopic description combines with the macroscopic one (the macroscopic measuring apparatus).
We see that the complete description of the set of intermediate cardinality falls into a chain of three theories. Each theory corresponds to a class of approximately equivalent intervals (scale). Non-equivalent macroscopic, submicroscopic, and microscopic intervals of the set of intermediate cardinality may not be regarded as the same homogeneous axis. As a result the description of the one-dimensional intermediate set is three-dimensional (or four-dimensional, including time). Thus we have three separate descriptions with their own particular main laws, dimensions, and directions.
At present, all the theories are imbedded in the continuous space of classical mechanics. As a result, the dimensions and the directions of the submicroscopic and microscopic descriptions are lost.
The total number of space time dimensions of three 3D descriptions is ten. The same number of dimensions appear in string theories. But the extra dimensions of the intermediate set are essentially microscopic and do not require compactification.
The directions of the submicroscopic and microscopic descriptions are replaced with spin. Reliable separation of the descriptions needs careful examination but it may be preliminarily stated that integer spin is the direction of the microscopic description and half integer spin is the direction of the submicroscopic one. Since the submicroscopic interval is the (unstable) continuous interval, its direction is associated with the direction of the macroscopic continuous interval. Therefore, the submicroscopic direction is not a vector of full value but only spinor.
The direction of the point-like proper microscopic interval is independent of the continuous direction.
Since the microscopic intervals are essentially non-equivalent, it should be expected that the proper microscopic description in turn splits into several "theories" subject to the number of microscopic scales (distinguishable cardinalities). The similar situation is considered as a disadvantage of string theories. This non-equivalent intervals form additional microscopic extra dimensions down to the single unit set.
Thus the answer to the question "why fermions and bosons obey different statistics?" may be very short: "because they belongs to the different de-scriptions". The Pauli exclusion principle is a condition for keeping inside the submicroscopic description (in other words, this is just a condition of conservation of submicroscopic cardinality): if two points at a submicroscopic distance come close enough, in the sense of the countable coordinate, they form the proper microscopic interval and go over to the proper microscopic description. In this case, some macroscopic and submicroscopic properties of the points of the interval may be lost.
Each microscopic scale should have analogous condition of conservation of its cardinality, i.e., the law of conservation of some qualitative property. Violation of this law means conversion of initial cardinality into cardinality of another scale.
The physical description of nature falls into a collection of different theories steadily resisting unification. The complete description of the intermediate set exhibits the same tendency. This is a consequence of the inherent structural nonuniformity of the set. The theory of everything seems to be an unreal concept analogous to the self-contradictory concept of the set of all sets. It is important to note that this description (or rather the system of descriptions) follows from the only assumption: the intermediate cardinality of the set. Nothing but several choices of the simplest option was still required.
